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Abstract—As applications of biometric verification proliferate,
users become more vulnerable to privacy infringement. Biometric
data is very privacy sensitive as it may contain information
as gender, ethnicity and health conditions which should not
be shared with third parties during the verification process.
Moreover, biometric data that has fallen into the wrong hands
often leads to identity theft. Secure biometric verification schemes
try to overcome such privacy threats. Unfortunately, existing
secure solutions either introduce a heavy computational or com-
munication overhead or have to accept a high loss in accuracy;
both of which make them impractical in real-world settings. This
paper presents a novel approach to secure biometric verification
aiming at a practical trade-off between efficiency and accuracy,
while guaranteeing full security against honest-but-curious adver-
saries. The system performs verification in the encrypted domain
using elliptic curve based homomorphic ElGamal encryption for
high efficiency. Classification is based on a log-likelihood ratio
classifier which has proven to be very accurate. No private
information is leaked during the verification process using a two-
party secure protocol. Initial tests show highly accurate results
that have been computed within milliseconds range.
Index Terms—Biometric template protection, homomorphic
encryption, likelihood ratio based biometric verification, honest-
but-curious adversarial model
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics are discriminative characteristics of the human
body that can be used for authentication (i.e. identity verifica-
tion) or identification related questions. These characteristics
can be physiological aspects of the body (e.g. fingerprints) or
can be embedded in the behavior of a person (e.g. a signature).
A biometric system uses these biometric identifiers to classify
an individual to an earlier enrolled identity in the system.
Biometric authentication relies on the primitive “user is
something”. Alternatives are “user knows something” (e.g.
passwords) or “user has something” (e.g. key cards). Each
primitive has its own upsides and its downsides. The main
merit of biometrics is their convenience since there is no need
to remember anything and it simply is available when needed.
Though, the main drawback is that biometric identifiers are
usually hard to keep secret and are not replaceable [21]. Also
the fact that a biometric identifier contains privacy sensitive
information about a person’s gender, ethnicity and health
implies that this data should be handled with care [17], [1].
As applications of biometric verification proliferate, users are
requested to hand over their identity more frequently to third
parties which might not be trustworthy.
In order to protect against this privacy infringement, biomet-
ric systems should be able to perform the classification without
revealing the original biometric data. Straightforward hashing
techniques, as applied to passwords, are not applicable here
as the classifier should be able to handle intra-user variations
in the biometric captures. An overview of related work in
section III shows that there are different methods to protect
biometric data. Some of these rely on one-way transformation
functions to obfuscate the data, where others try to handle
the intra-user variations using error correcting techniques. The
main problem with these approaches are the negative effects
on the biometric classification accuracy. Modern approaches
use homomorphic encryption to perform the classification on
encrypted versions of the biometric templates, but tend to be
slow for highly accurate systems.
In this work we present a novel approach to perform a
biometric classification on a centralized system designed with
privacy protection in mind. On top of that we aim to create a
system with high accuracy and high performance. The system
is build around a log-likelihood ratio classifier which is known
to yield optimal results in terms of accuracy [2]. Privacy is
protected by performing the classification in the encrypted
domain using homomorphic encryption. This allows us to
protect both the inputs and the outputs of the verification
process such that no privacy sensitive data is revealed. We
use an implementation of ElGamal on elliptic curves which
allows us to perform fast classifications (millisecond range).
In order to perform the verification efficiently we quantize the
classifier without giving up too much of accuracy (an EER of
0,3% versus 0,2% in the optimal case).
As this paper focusses on privacy protection, the terms
security and privacy might become unclear. System security
prevents an attacker from circumventing the system by getting
accepted even though he cannot verify his identity. Privacy
covers the fact that a compromised system does not leak
any information about the biometric data it stores. These two
principles overlap where an attacker tries to get accepted
by means of a stolen biometric sample. For instance by
eavesdropping on an unsafe authentication attempt from a legit
user. Therefore it is important to protect the biometric data in
order to strengthen the overall system security.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. It
starts with a short introduction to biometric verification in
section II. Section III goes into the current state of the art
of template protection. It provides an overview of related
work and defines the concept of a secure biometric template.
After the context of our work is given section IV provides a
global overview of the secure biometric verification system we
are introducing. It covers the goals we are trying to achieve
with the system, its architecture, and the security assumptions
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2about its environment. The paper continues with explaining
the building blocks on which the system relies. The classifier
and the encryption scheme are covered in subsection V-A
and section VI. The exact functional description is covered in
section VII. In section VIII we prove the system’s correctness
and security. The performance of the system is assessed in
section IX. The paper concludes in section X reflecting on
our goals and looks ahead to future work.
II. BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS
Biometric systems attempt to recognize a person based on
his biometric characteristics [11]. Therefore the system first
learns about a person during an enrollment phase. During the
verification phase it checks whether a person matches a certain
identity claim. This section describes a generic biometric
system as it is depicted in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. A schematic view of a generic biometric system. The left hand
side models the enrollment process, while the right hand side models the
verification process. The verification result shows whether the biometric
identifier matches the identity claim, based on the similarity score S and
threshold t.
A system consists of multiple components which cooperate
to produce a verification result; an identity claim gets accepted
or rejected. The first component is the biometric sensor which
takes a biometric sample from a person. The raw sensor data
is processed by the feature extractor. The features are numeric
representations of the identifier which together form a feature
vector. During enrollment the system stores a feature vector
as a template in a database under a unique key for retrieval at
a later time.
When a user makes an identity claim, the system captures
his biometric identifier which is converted to a feature vector
as a probe. The comparator checks if the probe and the tem-
plate in the database form a matching identity. As biometric
identifiers may change over time and the sensor picks up noise,
the probe will differ from the template and will never yield
an exact match. This makes the comparison a classification
problem which is solved by the comparator by calculating a
similarity score S. This score expresses the confidence that
two features belong to the same person. If the score exceeds
a certain threshold t the identity claim gets accepted.
Biometric matching is, as most classification problems, not
perfect. A genuine verification attempt may get rejected, or
an impostor may mistakenly get accepted. Figure 2 shows the
typical score distributions for genuine and impostor verifica-
tions. The diagonally shaded areas denote the classification
errors which depend on the threshold value. The threshold can
be tuned to shift the trade-off between a higher False Accept
Rate (FAR) versus a lower False Reject Rate (FRR) and vice
versa.
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Fig. 2. Classification Errors for a certain threshold t. Moving the threshold
allows to accept higher FARs for lower FRRs.
The accuracy of a biometric system is therefore expressed
in the error rates given a certain threshold value [12]. A good
performing biometric system yields a low FAR and a low
FRR. One measure to express the performance of a biometric
system is the Equal Error Rate (EER) where the FAR and
FRR are equal for a certain threshold. An Receiver Operation
Characteristic (ROC) curve is used to express the systems
accuracy in a graphical way. This curve plots the FAR against
the Genuine Accept Rate (GAR) for certain thresholds. The
GAR is the percentage of correctly classified persons and
equals 1−FRR.
III. TEMPLATE PROTECTION
Template protection schemes are designed to protect the bio-
metric data when the biometric system gets compromised [3].
An attacker who gets a hold on a protected template should
not be able to recover the original biometric data. A secure
template should possess the following three properties as
described by [16].
1) Non-invertibility: It must be a computational hard task
to recover the original biometric data from a secure
template. The original template can be converted by
applying a one-way function to it. One-wayness implies
that the comparator also has no knowledge of the
original biometric either and therefore should be able
to operate on the transformed or encrypted data.
2) Accuracy: Transformation to a secure template may
affect the systems matching precision negatively. If
3the transformation throws away too much information
about the template the FAR increases, which forms a
vulnerability on its own.
3) Diversity: It must be possible to generate multiple
versions of the same template. This property allows a
template to be invalidated when it gets compromised and
re-issue a template to grant the legitimate user access
again. Another implication is that a user can use different
‘pseudonyms’ (i.e. enrollments) for different systems
which prevents traceability and protect his identity.
Research in the area of template protection schemes can be
split into two main categories following the research of [18]:
Feature Transformations and Biometric Crypto-Systems. Apart
from these two approaches a third category can be added
which focusses on performing the template comparison in the
encrypted domain. Some examples of these techniques are
described in the remainder of this section.
A. Feature Transformations
Secure templates based on Feature Transformations generate
an alternative representation of the original biometric feature
vector. Comparing two feature vectors is done by applying the
transformation function on both the template and the probe and
perform the matching on the transformed data. Known imple-
mentations of feature transformations are BioHashing [13] and
Cancelable Transformations [20].
Transformations are based on a secret to create different rep-
resentations. A different secret yields a different representation
which satisfies the diversity property of a secure template.
The challenge is to create a transformation function that
is non-invertible and keeps the intra-user variations intact.
Studies show that feature transformations often create a trade-
off between accuracy and non-invertibility [14], [18]. This is
unwanted as it makes it possible to create approximations of
the biometric identifier from the secure template.
B. Biometric Crypto-Systems
This class of systems avoid the fuzzy matching process by
finding the ‘stable’ features in a biometric identifier. These
systems try to capture the same feature vector each time a user
presents his identifier to the sensor. By using error correcting
techniques they try to reconstruct the features from the sensor
data, and a piece of ‘helper data’ which is stored during
enrollment. The helper data should not leak any data about
the biometric identifier. However, in practice this appears not
to be the case and is it possible to extract information about
the biometric identifier from it [10].
The stable feature vectors can be used as key in a crypto-
graphic scheme, (e.g. AES). Implementations of these systems
can either be key-generating [7] or key-binding [19]. In case
of the former the identifier is the key, while with the latter the
key is chosen and encoded in the biometric using the helper
data.
C. Biometric Systems in the Encrypted Domain
This class of systems provides true cryptographic security
to protect the biometric data from leaking. There are multiple
options to perform biometric verification in the encrypted
domain. Homomorphic biometric systems are able to encrypt
a biometric template while still being able to perform fuzzy
matching on the encrypted data. Another method is the use of
Garbled Circuits (GCs) which allows two parties to evaluate a
series of logical gates without learning its structure and only
revealing the output.
Both approaches typically are very well in protecting pri-
vacy, but tend to be slow. Computational complexity often
forms a trade-off with accuracy.
One homomorphically based system shows a method for
comparing IrisCodes which consist of 4096 binary fea-
tures [22]. Computing the similarity score of two feature
vectors is done by calculating the hamming distance of the bit
strings. This operation can be done in the encrypted domain
by using the Goldwasser-Micali scheme. Initial results yield
matching times of several minutes, which can be sped up
running the matching algorithm on an approximation of the
biometric templates.
Another, more generic homomorphic biometric system, is
based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [23]. An SVM is
a powerful classification tool which projects feature vectors
as points in a multi-dimensional space. During enrollment
it defines a hyperplane which divides the space into a part
for genuine feature vectors and a part for impostors. For
classification it checks in which part the probe is placed. This
can be computed efficiently in the encrypted domain using
RSA. The authors report an EER of 2% at a matching speed
of about a second per biometric comparison.
One method using GCs focusses on iris-code verifica-
tion [15]. It operates by implementing a logic circuit which
computes the hamming distance over two bit strings repre-
senting the template and the probe. The outcome is used in a
circuit which performs the threshold comparison. This method
is fast (536ms) and yields an EER of 1.4%.
D. Overview
Following the definition of a secure template the biometric
systems in the encrypted domain show the most promising
results as shown in Table I. The plus and minus signs in the
table denote well or missing properties. The “±” denotes a
property which is affected by a trade-off situation.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SECURE TEMPLATE SCHEMES
Non-invertibility Accuracy Diversity
Feature Transform. ± - +
Bio. Crypto-Systems - - -
Sys. in the Encr. Dom. + ± +
Proposed System + + +
Feature transformations are either invertible or struggle to
reach a high accuracy. Some of these methods reveal privacy
sensitive information about the biometric data, but solutions
to overcome this have a negative effect on accuracy.
Biometric crypto-systems also have some open challenges.
The main problem is that these systems do not cope well
with the diversity property. Also, the error correction codes
4on which these schemes depend, need to be designed in such
a way that they dont leak information about the biometric data.
This appears to be hard according to some studies.
The approaches in the encrypted domain score well on
both the non-invertibility as the diversity properties. The
main challenge is to balance computational complexity versus
accuracy.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The previous section shows that the current state of the art
of biometric systems in the encrypted domain is promising, but
can be improved in terms of speed and accuracy. This section
provides an overview of a new biometric verification method
es on privacy protection of its users, and aims to improve
current solutions.
Our main goal is to create a biometric verification system
which protects the users’ privacy by not revealing any infor-
mation about their biometric identifiers. This goal should hold
at any stage during the verification process, even if parts of
the system are compromised.
The system requirements with regard to security are formu-
lated as follows:
1) The system does not reveal the biometric templates at
any stage of the verification process.
2) The biometric comparator does not learn the probes
during the verification process.
3) The system does not reveal the similarity score at any
time during the verification process.
4) The biometric comparator does not learn the verification
result.
To satisfy these requirements the system is constructed
using homomorphic encryption techniques to perform the
verification while securing the biometric data.
For a highly accurate system we rely on a likelihood ratio
based classification system. This is a generic classification
method which can be applied on multiple biometric identifier
types. Studies show that this classifier behaves optimal in a
sense that it yields the minimal FAR for a given FRR and
vice versa [2].
First we describe the architecture and the components of
the system. Then we consider the environment the system
operates in by defining the attacker model and listing the
security assumptions we made.
A. System Architecture
The system is constructed following the model of a generic
biometric system in section II. We assume that it operates in a
distributed environment where multiple clients are supported
by a centralized server. A communication channel exists
between both parties to send and receive messages.
A client device embeds a sensor to capture a biometric
sample from a user and takes the identity u claim as input.
The device is able to pre-process the raw data and extracts the
feature vector ~p from it. The procedure capture() models this
behavior and returns a tuple (u, ~p). The clients are called the
sensor devices.
The server is referred to as the verification service. The
verification service is a database to secure biometric templates.
The procedure FetchTemplate(u) queries the database to find
the template Tu for identity u.
Feature comparison and matching is a joined effort of both
parties which run a secure protocol to achieve that. The result
of the protocol is that only the client knows if the identity
claim is accepted.
B. Attacker Model
The attacker model defines what we are protecting against.
We assume that an adversary can be modeled by the semi-
honest attacker model. This assumption beholds that an at-
tacker can gain full access to the system for observation, but
will not alter its behavior. Such an attacker is honest-but-
curious and may try to gather as much information as possible,
only based on his observations.
In case of a compromised party, the attacker gets full control
about all the information of that part of system.
We assume that no collusion takes place. This means that
the sensor device and verification service do not exchange
information to corrupt the system. In other words it means
that both systems may not get in control by the same attacker
at the same time.
Finally, we also assume that enrollment takes place in an
offline, secure setting. In a real world situation this step should
take place in a controlled environment where it is possible for
the user to check that the device is not tampered with.
V. LIKELIHOOD RATIO BASED CLASSIFICATION
The secure biometric verification system we describe in
this paper is based on a Log-Likelihood Ratio Classifier.
This section describes how, and under which assumptions this
classifier operates. First we describe the standard likelihood
ratio as it can be applied in a biometric setting. Next we show
a variant of the likelihood classifier by quantizing the features
and the similarity scores. These steps are required to apply an
encryption layer over the system, protecting the biometric data.
Finally we describe the finite outcome space of the quantized
classifier which we use for the system evaluation.
A. Likelihood Ratio
The likelihood function L(ω|x) expresses the probability
of observing a certain value x given a certain class ω. The
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Λ(x) expresses how more likely it is
that an observation x belongs to a certain class. The LR is
defined as:
Λ(x) =
L(ω|x)
L(ω¯|x) =
Pr(x|ω)
Pr(x|ω¯) (1)
In the biometric setting the input consists of a probe and a
template feature p and t. Instead of denoting wether an input
is from a certain class (i.e. user), it calculates the LR of two
features being from the same user L(same|p, t), or being from
different users L(same|p, t). The LR in the biometric setting
becomes:
Λ(p, t) =
L(same|p, t)
L(same|p, t) =
fg(p, t)
fb(p, t)
(2)
5In this equation fg and fb are respectively the probability
density functions (PDFs) of the genuine and the background
distribution.
We assume that biometric features can be modeled as
samples from a Gaussian distribution T . A feature can then
be modeled by a user specific component M and a noise
component N such that M +N = T ∼ N (0, 1).
The class mean µu ∈M ∼ N (0, σ2b ) is the distinctive value
to classify a feature to a user u. The parameter σ2b is referred
to as the between user variance.
Noise can be modeled as Gaussian distribution N ∼
N (0, σ2w). The parameter σ2w is called the within user variance
(i.e. intra-user variance). Noise is modeled per feature, inde-
pendent from the user [4]. This means that noise has the same
effect on a feature for each user. Though, different features
have different noise behavior, described by the value of σ2w.
This models ‘good’ features which are less influenced by noise
and are easier to classify than ‘bad’ features.
The PDF fg is a bivariate Normal distribution N (
(
0
0
)
,Σ).
The covariance matrix Σ is defined by:
Σ =
(
E(TpTp) E(TpTt)
E(TtTp) E(TtTt)
)
=
(
1 σ2b
σ2b 1
)
(3)
In this equation Tp and Tt are the distributions of the inputs
p and t. As the inputs are features from the same person
they share the same user specific component but have different
noise components (resp. M +Np and M +Nt).
The PDF fb takes two independent variables as input as p
and t are inputs from different users. Therefore it is possible
to write the joint probability as the multiplication of the two
single probabilities ft(x)ft(y). Here is ft the PDF of the total
feature distribution T .
With the probability density functions known, the likelihood
ratio can be computed. For computational convenience the
Log-Likelihood Ratio (LLR) λ can be used:
λ(p, t) = 12
(
(p2 + t2)− ( p t )Σ−1 ( pt ))− 12 ln(|Σ|) (4)
To use the LLR it is assumed that it is possible to extract
uncorrelated features from a biometric identifier. This allows to
compare two feature vectors by summing the individual feature
comparisons. A comparator C to calculate the similarity score
of k-dimensional feature vectors is defined as:
C(~p,~t) =
k−1∑
i=0
λ(pi, ti) (5)
B. Feature Quantization
In order to lower the complexity of the LLR comparator
we propose a way to precompute the outcomes. To limit the
infinite possible outcomes in the continuous case we quantize
the features over 2b equiprobable bins B. Equiprobability
means that an arbitrary feature observation is just as likely
to land in any of those bins.
We define the quantization function q : T 7→ B to determine
in which bin a feature is placed. The functions u(β) and l(β)
respectively determine the upper and lower bounds of a bin
β ∈ B. Then u′(x) and l′(x) are respectively defined as (u ◦
q)(x) and (l ◦ q)(x).
In the quantized case the LR can be redefined as Λ′. The
numerator becomes the probability of an observation in a
certain area, given that the features originate from the same
person. The denominator becomes the probability of observing
an arbitrary combination of two features in that area:
Λ′(p, t) =
Pr(l′(p) < Tp < u′(p), l′(t) < Tt < u′(t)|same)
Pr(l′(p) < Tp < u′(p), l′(t) < Tt < u′(t))
(6)
The quantized version of the LLR λ′ can then be defined
by integrating over the PDFs.
λ′(p, t) = ln(
∫ u′(p)
l′(p)
∫ u′(t)
l′(t)
fg(p, t) dt dp)−
ln(
∫ u′(p)
l′(p)
∫ u′(t)
l′(t)
fb(p, t) dtdp)
(7)
This definition of the LLR can be used to precompute the
similarity scores of all possible observations of a quantized
feature. The results can be organized in a in a 2b× 2b lookup
table Tb,ρ.
Tb,ρ =

s0,0 s0,1 · · · s0,2b−1
s1,0 s1,1 · · · s1,2b−1
...
...
. . .
...
s2b−1,0 s2b−1,1 · · · s2b−1,2b−1
 (8)
In this table are x, y ∈ B and sx,y = λ∗(x, y); the LLR with
integral limits defined by u and l. The subscript ρ denotes the
characteristic between user variance σ2b
We use T (x)b,ρ to denote the xth row of a lookup table.
C. Score Quantization
The lookup table Tb consists of similarity scores sx,y ∈ R.
A second quantization step is required to convert the scores
to integer values in order to protect these number using an
encryption layer. Therefore we define q∆ : R 7→ N where
q∆(s) is a uniform quantization function with step size ∆.
D. Score Distribution
In the continuous case the number of possible comparison
scores is infinite. Due to the quantization steps the outcomes
of the comparison are limited. The quantized score distribution
of a single quantized feature is the set of the values in a lookup
table.
S = {sx,y|x, y ∈ B} (9)
The score domain [min(S),max(S)] describes the boundaries
of possible scores.
We can also consider the score distribution of a biometric
identifier described by a k-dimensional feature vector. The
total score distribution S is then defined by the convolution of
the single feature distributions S0 ∗S1 ∗ · · · ∗Sk−1. The score
domain of S is defined by [
∑k−1
i=0 min(Si),
∑k−1
i=0 max(Si)].
6VI. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
To protect the templates we use ElGamal encryption as it
possesses all the cryptographic properties we need [8]. This
section gives a short review on the cryptographic scheme and
discusses the properties used in the proposed system.
The security of ElGamal is provided by the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption about the underlying cyclic
group. The DDH implies that it is computationally hard to
solve a logarithm in a cyclic group. This is known as the
discrete log problem (DLP).
Let G be a cyclic group of size p generated by g. The
private key a is a random number between 1 and the order
of the group. The public key h is constructed by raising the
generator to the power a:
〈g〉 = G, |G| = p, a ∈R (0, |G|), h = ga (10)
The encryption function E to encrypt message m ∈ G
yields a tuple (c1, c2) is defined by:
E(m) = (gr, mhr) with r ∈R (0, |G|) (11)
The random r makes ElGamal probabilistic such that different
encryptions of the same message yield different ciphertexts.
This property also makes ElGamal Indistinguishable Under
Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) secure under the DDH
assumption.
For notation we denote an encrypted value with double
brackets J·K. In case m is a vector or matrix the elements
of JmK are encrypted component-wise.
Any party in possession of the secret key a can evaluate the
decryption function D which is defined as:
D(c1, c2) = c
−a
1 c2 = (g
r)−a(m(ga)r)
= m(gr−aga+r) = m
(12)
1) Additive Homomorphism: Homomorphic cryptographic
schemes allow us to make computations in the encrypted do-
main. ElGamal is multiplicative homomorphic as JmKJm′K =Jmm′K which is illustrated below:
(c1, c2)(c
′
1, c
′
2) = ((g
r)(gr
′
), (mhr)(m′hr
′
))
= (gr+r
′
, mm′hr+r
′
)
(13)
During secure biometric verification we want to sum encrypted
similarity scores from the feature comparators in the encrypted
domain. It is possible to use ElGamal in an additive homo-
morphic mode by encoding the messages as exponent of the
generator gm [5]. This yields:
Jgm1KJgm2K = Jgm1+m2K (14)
The downside of this approach is that after decrypting the
ciphertext the message can not be retrieved without solving the
DLP gm. However, it is trivial to spot wether m equals zero as
m = 0 ⇐⇒ gm = 1. We will make use of this fact to achieve
an efficient secure comparison protocol in subsection VII-B.
2) Secret Sharing: No single party in the system should
be able to decrypt a ciphertext on his own as it may leak
the templates. Therefore it is possible to set up a threshold
variant of ElGamal [6]. As there are only two parties, which
both should comply to a decryption we can simply split the
secret key additively in two random shares: a = a1 + a2.
A party, which possesses one of the key shares a1 is able
to perform a partial decryption:
D1(c1, c2) = (c
−a1
1 , c2) = (c
′
1, c
′
2) (15)
The function D1 yields a partially decrypted ciphertext which
we denote by single brackets [·]. A partially decrypted cipher-
text does not leak any information as it is indistinguishable
from an ElGamal encryption of a random message under the
public key ga2 .
A second decryption step D2, using the second part of the
key retrieves the message.
D2(c
′
1, c
′
2) = (c
′−a2
1 )(c
′
2) = ((g
r)−a1)−a2(m(ga)r)
= (g−r(a1+a2))(m(gar)) = m
(16)
VII. SECURE LLR BASED BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION
This section combines the building blocks from the previous
sections in order to create a system to perform a secure
biometric verification using the quantized log-likelihood based
classifier. The main objective is that the server gets no knowl-
edge about the biometric data.
To achieve this we run a two party protocol such that table
lookups can be done in an oblivious fashion such that both
parties can not tell which values are selected. Protecting the
lookup values is required as it directly points to an x and y
value which encodes the probe and template input.
We also want to protect the similarity score to prevent a
hill climbing attack. Observing the score allows an attacker to
modify its input feature vector such that it gets closer to the
original template with each iteration.
Finally we want to make sure that the verification result is
only learned by the client and not by the server.
A. Secure Biometric Enrollment
The first step, prior to verification, is to enroll new users
to the system. Enrollment takes place on a sensor device
which captures a biometric identifier and creates a secure
template from it. A secure template is created from raw,
unprotected biometric data. Therefore we should assume that
the enrollment of new users happens in an offline, secure and
fully controlled environment.
The enrollment process starts with constructing a secure
template. Therefore we first start with a definition of a template
in this system. Note that, considering a lookup of a similarity
score sx,y in a quantized comparator, the x and y value are
respectively the enrollment observation and the verification
observation. A template can thus be seen as the first argument
of a lookup in a table. It selects the row where the similarity
score can be found during verification.
7For a biometric identifier described by a k-dimensional
feature vector k lookup tables Tb,ρ0 , Tb,ρ1 , . . . , Tb,ρk−1 can be
constructed. A quantized feature vector ~p defines the rows to
select during enrollment. The template Tu can be constructed
by augmenting the corresponding rows from the lookup tables.
Tu =
(
(T (p0)b,ρ0 )>|(T
(p1)
b,ρ1
)>| . . . |(T (pk−1)b,ρk−1 )>
)>
(17)
After the sensor device constructed the template from the
enrollment data it encrypts it using the public key of the
system. The encrypted template JTuK is send over to the
verification service which stores the template under key u for
later retrieval.
The lookup tables should be considered public knowl-
edge to anyone who is able to retrieve the variance vector
〈ρ0, ρ1, . . . ρk−1〉 which describes the feature distributions.
The sole purpose of encryption is to hide which rows are
selected from these tables.
B. Secure Biometric Verification
The verification protocol consists of a comparison and
matching stage. The first stage compares a biometric probe to
a secure template and yields an encrypted similarity score JSK.
The second stage determines if there is a match by securely
comparing the score to a threshold t. Each stage completes
in a single communication round between the sensor and the
verification service. A schematic view of the protocol is given
in Figure 3.
Secure Biometric Verification Protocol
Sensor Device Verification Service
u, ~p← Capture()
u
JTuK← FetchTable(u)
JTuK
J~sK← Lookup(JTuK, ~p)
JSK← J0 + k−1∑
i=0
siK
JSK
JCK← Compare(JSK, t)
pi(JCK)
[C]← D1(JCK)
[C]
C ← D2([C])
∃c ∈ C : c = 0 =⇒ S ≥ t
Fig. 3. Secure Verification Protocol
1) Secure Comparison: The comparison protocol starts
with a call to capture() at the sensor which yields a quantized
probe vector ~p and an identity claim u. The identity claim
is sent over the the verification service which uses u to fetch
the corresponding secure template JTuK from its database. The
template is sent to the sensor.
The sensor uses ~p and JTuK to perform a lookup for each
feature. The rows in JTuK are partial lookups which have been
created during the enrollment stage. Each feature pi defines
the column in the ith row of JTuK which contains the similarity
score JsiK. This score equals the score sx,y ∈ Tb,ρi and
expresses the likelihood of enrollment feature x and probe
feature y being from the same person.
To come to a cumulative (i.e. vector) similarity score JSK
the sensor sums the feature scores J0+∑k−1i=0 siK. The addition
of zero randomizes the outcome of the sum. This prevents an
attacker who gets hold of the encrypted template to guess the
elements which yield the same value as JSK as this would leak
the probe.
2) Secure Matching: The second stage tries to determine
wether the similarity score exceeds a certain the thresholdJS > tK. There is no direct homomorphic equivalent for the
comparison operator, but it is possible to check for equality
by checking wether the decryption of JS − tK equals 0.
The score is an element of the total score distribution S ∈ S.
The distribution is finite and discrete due to the quantization
of the comparator as shown in subsection V-D. Therefore it is
possible to check if the score S has a value t ≤ S ≤ max(S)
by calculating JS − t− iK for all 0 ≤ i ≤ max(S)− t.
This stage of the protocol starts with the sensor sendingJSK to the verification service. The verification service then
computes the encrypted result set JCK which equals J{r(S −
t − i)|∀0 ≤ i ≤ max(S) − t, r ∈R [1, |G|]}K. The procedure
compare() performs this computation based on an encrypted
score and a threshold value.
To protect the values in the result set we multiplicative blind
the elements with a random value r. Finally we remove any
ordering in the set by applying a random permutation pi(JCK).
To check for a match the verification service creates a partial
decryption [C] and sends it back to the sensor. The sensor
decrypts the result set C and concludes that S is larger then
the threshold value if, and only if the result set contains a
0-value.
VIII. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section proves that the proposed system is actually
secure and does not leak any information in the semi-honest
model. This is done by systematically checking the correctness
and security for both the enrollment and the verification
protocol.
Correctness shows that the proposed protocols work as
intended under the assumption that both parties act according
to the description. We show that each procedure in the system
outputs correct results.
To prove security of the protocols we follow the “real-vs.-
ideal” framework [9]. This framework shows that a protocol
can be modeled in the ideal situation by performing all com-
putations at a trusted third party given the input parameters.
Then the framework states that all malicious intents in the real
protocol can be simulated in the ideal model. The Composition
Theorem [9, Theorem 7.3.3] allows to evaluate the security of
each step in a protocol individually to make statements about
the protocol as a whole.
A. Correctness
1) Enrollment Protocol:
8• We assume that the capture procedure at the sensor
device is implemented correctly and yields the intended
results: the k-dimensional feature vector ~p and the iden-
tity claim u.
• Template construction is described in subsection VII-A.
The template Tu is a k by 2b matrix where each row
equals the pith row of lookup table Tb,ρi . Each element
in the template gets encrypted using the ElGamal crypto-
graphic scheme to get JTuK. This does not alter the values
of the template by definition of the encryption function
shown in section VI.
• The database stores the exact value of JTuK under the key
u for retrieval at verification time.
2) Verification Protocol:
• We make the same assumption as in the enrollment pro-
tocol that the capture procedure is implemented correctly
and yields a k-dimensional quantized feature vector ~p and
identity claim u.
• fetchTemplate queries the database for the template un-
der key u. The result is the exact output of the template
which is stored during enrollment. If that procedure
is performed correct, the output JTuK consists of an
encrypted k by 2b-matrix where the ith row equals the
pi
th row from Tb,ρi .
• Given the values in ~p lookup selects element pi from
the ith row of JT K which equals an encryption of the
feature similarity score spi,i ∈ Tb,ρi . The elements Jspi,iK
are summed using the additive homomorphic property of
ElGamal to compute JSK.
• The verification service receives the encrypted similarity
score JSK which it uses to compute the matching set JCK
using the compare procedure. The compare algorithm
tests for equality by calculating JCK = {rJS − t −
iK|0 ≤ i ≤ max(S) − t} with random r ∈ [1, |G|]. The
homomorphic subtraction and the scalar multiplication
are correct by the definition of ElGamal in section VI.
If S ≥ t, then rJS − t − iK = J0K for a certain i. All
other values are encryptions of random numbers. The
procedure returns a partial decrypted, permuted version
of the matching result: [C]. Permuting the elements of
[C] only changes the order but not its values.
• The final step decrypts the values of [C] which results in
a shuffled set of the values C = {r(S − t − i)|0 ≤ i ≤
max(S)− t}.
B. Security
1) Enrollment Protocol:
a) Compromised Sensor: We assume that during enroll-
ment the sensor is placed in a controlled offline environment
where no tampering with the device occurs during template
construction.
b) Compromised Verification Service: The server re-
ceives an encrypted template JTuK. The template consists
of encrypted rows from different lookup tables. Due to the
IND-CPA security property of ElGamal the server is not able
to distinguish an encryption of a certain row from random
data. Also, due to the equiprobable distributed features, each
row is as likely to be included in the template as any other
row which makes it impossible to make an educated guess.
2) Verification Protocol:
a) Compromised Sensor: First we consider the situation
where the sensor is compromised. During the first round of
the protocol the sensor receives JTuK, a matrix of ElGamal
encrypted messages. Based on the IND-CPA security of
ElGamal we can claim that an adversary at the sensor can not
distinguish between the elements in the matrix, and therefore
does not learn anything about it. As the used cipher is
threshold based, the adversary at the sensor only has a part of
the decryption key, which makes it impossible to decrypt the
matrix on its own.
After the second round in the protocol the sensor receives
[C], a vector of partial decrypted messages. Using secret key of
the sensor it can recover C. The values in C are blinded by an
unknown randomization factor r in the compare() algorithm.
As 0 · r = 0 the only value which is revealed to the sensor is
0 which is the intended outcome. Any information introduced
by the sequential construction of C in compare() is removed
by returning a random permutation of the result.
b) Compromised Verification Service: The second part of
the security argument involves the evaluation of the situation
where the verification service is compromised. During the first
round of the protocol the verification service receives an unen-
crypted identity claim u, which is by design of the verification
process. The claim does not contain any information on the
biometric, so the requirements are still met.
During the comparison round of the protocol the verification
service gets JSK. This number is encrypted under Threshold
ElGamal, and therefore IND-CPA secure. No information
about S is revealed.
C. Secure Biometric Template
In this section we stress that the biometric templates as
defined in this system satisfy the non-invertibility and diversity
properties of a secure template.
A secure template consists of an encrypted matrix where
each row is selected from a lookup table Tb,ρ. First we note
that each row is as likely to be selected as any other row
due to the equiprobable feature quantization. This makes it
impossible to make an educated guess which row is encrypted.
Second, we note that is impossible to distinguish between
rows due to the IND-CPA property of ElGamal. This property
makes that identical scores in the lookup table have different
representations in the encrypted form. This rules out the option
to identify a row from the lookup table based on the encrypted
representation.
These two characteristics make that no information is leaked
from the secure template. Given that it is infeasible to break
the ElGamal cipher without knowledge of the decryption key
we claim that the templates in this system satisfy the non-
invertibility property.
The diversity property is trivial by the possibility to re-
randomize ciphertexts in ElGamal. This allows us to generate
complete new representations without changing the content of
the template.
9IX. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to make any claims about the performance of our
systems we created a proof of concept implementation. This
section focusses on performance in terms of accuracy and
speed.
Both the feature and the score quantization steps influence
the accuracy of the system. To show that these effects are
minimal we conduct a small experiment which benchmarks
the quantized comparator to the continuous (i.e. optimal) case.
As the encryption layer does not influence the accuracy of the
system we can evaluate the quantization effects on its own.
The quantization parameters and the feature selection have
an effect on the processing speed of the system. To get a
good intuition about how the parameters influence the system
we simulate various operational settings to evaluate the system
performance.
A. Accuracy Assessment
In order to show that the effects introduced by quantizing
the comparator are minimal we created a set of ROC curves
to asses the precision loss. Quantization depends on two
parameters b and ∆.
The feature quantization parameter b yield a denser lookup
table for higher values. A denser lookup table gives a better
approximation of the continuous LLR. The downside of a
denser lookup table is that it requires more space to store,
which also impacts the processing time.
The score quantization parameter ∆ influences the scoring
scale. Lowering ∆ creates a more accurate scale, but drasti-
cally increased the score domain which negatively impacts the
performance.
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Fig. 4. ROC curves illustrating the accuracy impact of quantization. Com-
paring the continuous case to a feature with σ2b = 0.9.
Figure 4 shows the ROC curves for various quantization
parameters. The left figure benchmarks different feature quan-
tization parameters against the optimal comparator. It shows
that the quantized ROC curves approach the continuous case
really quick to a point where it makes no sense to make the
lookup table any denser. This break-even point is reached at
b = 4 for a feature with characteristic σ2b = 0.9. This point
is reached faster for lower between class variances. Raising
the variance requires higher values of b. However, in reality
features of such precision do not exist.
The right plot in Figure 4 shows how the score quantization
influences the precision of the comparator considering the
same feature with a feature quantization of b = 4. It shows
that the score quantization barely impacts the accuracy and
that a ∆ = 1 is a reasonable value to use.
Based on these results the quantized LLR comparator can be
used as a good approximation of the continuous comparator.
B. System Speed Assessment
1) Implementation and Runtime Environment: To run some
basic experiments we implemented the system and some mea-
surement tools in Python 3.5.1. The ElGamal cryptographic
layer is implemented on a group structure defined on elliptic
curves. Elliptic curves provide a speed up compared to integer
group structures and require smaller group orders for the same
level of security. For the implementation of elliptic curve
cryptography we rely the SECCURE cryptographic library.
The selected curve is named ‘secp112r1’ which is a curve over
a 112-bit prime field. This curve is mainly chosen because
of its small group size and fast performance on arithmetic
operations.
The experiments are performed on a MacBook Pro 2.8GHz
Intel Core i7, 16GB memory, Intel Iris 1536MB graphical
chip, with a 512GB SSD. This system is able to perform an
ElGamal elliptic curve encryption in 2.96 ms, measured over
100 samples. Decryptions require 938 µs on average over 1000
samples. Homomorphic additions take 12 µs (10000 samples)
and scalar multiplications are done in 1.95 ms (1000 samples).
2) Parameter Selection: The bottleneck of the system lies
in the score comparison protocol. This is by far the slowest
step of the protocol as it requires the computation of α =
max(S) − t encrypted numbers. A large score domain yields
a larger value for α.
The following parameters influence the score domain.
1) the number of features k.
2) the quality of the feature ρ.
3) the feature quantization parameter b.
4) the score quantization parameter ∆.
5) the threshold t.
In an operational setting the feature parameters k and ρ are
implied by the biometric identifier. However, in this experi-
mental setting the features are simulated. For this experiment
we select 3 feature sets with different properties which could
represent real world situations (See Table II).
TABLE II
FEATURE SETS
id k Features ~ρ
fs1 21 〈0.7, 0.71, . . . , 0.89, 0.9〉
fs2 20 〈0.8, 0.8, . . . , 0.8, 0.8〉
fs3 12 〈0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9〉
The experiment is conducted with 6 quantization settings
which we apply on each feature set. The quantization pa-
rameters are chosen based on the observations of the ac-
curacy experiment. The number of comparisons depends on
the threshold t. To come to a fair comparison t is set to
the value for which the comparator reaches the EER. We
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express its speed in terms of the number of comparisons α. A
single number comparison requires one homomorphic additionJS − t′K, one scalar multiplication Jr(S − t′)K, a decryption
step at the verification service [r(S − t′)] and a decryption
at the sensor device. Table III shows the results of measuring
the processing time for various values of α. The performance
scales linear with the size of α allowing us to do around 250
comparisons per second.
TABLE III
PROCESSING TIME FOR α THRESHOLD COMPARISONS
α 10 20 30 40 50 60 80
time (in ms) 40 80 130 170 210 250 330
3) Performance Results: Figure 5 shows the results of
the 18 experiments. The grouped bars represent the results
for various feature selections. The different shades of grey
represent the quantization parameter sets. The height of the
bars express the accuracy of the system as EER. For each
feature set we add the EER in continuous setting as benchmark
which we consider as the optimal case for the LLR comparator.
The diamonds show how well the system performed in terms
of speed, expressed in the number of threshold comparisons
α.
The graphs clearly show the trade-off between accuracy and
processing time as better accuracy values are associated with
larger values for α. It also shows that larger values of k (fs1
and fs2) yield better results then poorer feature selections (fs3).
We note that the the feature quantization parameter b
barely influences the outcome of the experiment in number
of threshold comparisons. Yet, raising this value improves the
accuracy of the system which is in tune with the observations
in the accuracy experiment.
Observing the score quantization parameter ∆, we note a
bigger influence on the system. Lowering ∆ exponentially
increases the required number of threshold comparisons, which
slows the system down. Though, if time is less of an issue, it
is possible to gain some accuracy here.
Overall the timings are very low and well within the range
of practical use cases. This claim holds, even in the worst-case
parameter selections. On top of that it shows the EER does
not deviate a lot from the optimal case where no quantization
is applied.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a novel secure biometric verification system
based on a LLR comparator and ElGamal homomorphic
cryptography. In order to apply the encryption layer to the
system we quantized the biometric data and adapted the LLR
comparator accordingly.
Measurements show that the goals in terms of accuracy
and speed are well met. Highly accurate secure biometric
verifications (with an EER of 0.3%) can be done in about 330
milliseconds. Accepting slightly less accurate settings lowers
this time to 150 milliseconds or even faster (<50 milliseconds)
if accuracy is less important.
With regard to privacy and security we conclude that the
templates satisfy all three properties of a secure template as
defined in section III. No information can be extracted from
the biometric templates due to the encryption layer. Yet, the
templates can be used for verification without decrypting the
biometric data. Measurements show that this can be done in a
highly accurate way compared to the optimal case. Diversity
is achieved by using different keys for different applications.
A. Future Work
Our research evaluation is based on simulated biometric
data. This shows very promising results but may not be a good
representative for real world behavior as it is hard to estimate
good feature parameters. A follow up research should test the
system on real biometric datasets.
In terms of security we are aware of the relative small
number of possible inputs for the system. This is inherent to
biometric data and not a shortcoming of this implementation.
An attacker with a lot of time and computational power should
be able to brute force this space to gain access to the system.
In practice this is not a problem as we can limit the number
of false requests to the verification service. This effectively
limits the number of adversarial trials. Another way to mitigate
this is to raise the number of features which describe the
identifier. Though, it might be hard as an identifier might not
contain enough entropy as the features should be independent.
Combining multiple biometric identifiers can probably solve
this issue. We see this as interesting future work.
Finally, we designed this system with biometric verifica-
tion in mind. Though, this approach might be applicable
in different fields where classification of encrypted data is
required. Further research might focus on generalizing the
system for other applications. As part of this generalization
it should be investigated if data distributions, other then
Gaussian distributed biometric data, are equally suitable for
this classification method.
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